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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMPLEX LEGAL LANDSCAPE
OF MEDIATOR LIABILITY
A. The Liability Landscape in Context
The topic of mediator liability' is both difficult and controversial. 2
The role of the mediator is complex and varies depending on the precise
context in which the mediator is operating.3 A plaintiff seeking to sue
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1. In a previous article, I attempted to demonstrate that mediators needed to consider
the possibility of liability. See Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary
Duties?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 731 (1984). That article was a conservative attempt to show
that functionable liability theories existed, especially in the family mediation context. Id.
at 736-39. I attempted to show that the law of fiduciary duties would subject mediators
to liability in certain cases, even if no other tbeory of liability could be adapted. Of
course, one problem with a theory of fiduciary duty is that it will not often enable
plaintiffs to pursue the kind of consequential damages that are possible when the theory
is professional malpractice or negligence. In the present Article, I provide a more
comprehensive view of the various liability theories for the purpose of providing a
background against which intelligent decisions concerning the propriety of model legislations
may be made.
2. Some mediators are disturbed enough about the liability problem to ask their clients
to sign a general exculpatory agreement. See CPR Model Procedure for Mediation of
Business Disputes, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, April 1986, at 15,
16. The Center for Public Resources' proposal for its Model Business Mediation Rules
includes § III, (11) which states: "The mediator shall not be liable for any act or omission
in connection with his role as mediator." Id. See also, J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION
339 (1984) [hereinafter MEDIATION]. Decisions Resources [formerly the Center for Dispute
Resolution] in Denver also requires clients to sign an exculpatory clause. Conversation
with Mary Margaret Golten, Administrative Partner of Decisions Resources (July 12,
1986). The effectiveness of exculpatory clauses, especially general exculpatory clauses that
purport to insulate mediators from all liability, is extremely dubious. The viability of
exculpatory clauses in mediation agreements may be a subject for another day, but it is
safe to say that the law frowns upon them, construes them narrowly, and often finds
them unenforceable. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS. 482-84 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. See also
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963) (exculpatory agreement signed by patient in hospital is ineffective and
against public policy). The agreements will not be enforced where there is an indication
of unequal bargaining power, where the implications of the waiver are not made known
to the plaintiff, or where the precise conduct being excused is not specifically mentioned.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 482-84. Although the precise facts may prove me wrong, I
predict that clauses exculpating mediators will not be favored by the courts.
3. Historically, mediators have played their most visible roles in the resolution of labor
disputes. More recently, mediation is being employed in family disputes, business, and a
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a mediator4 may rely on several theories,5 in various combinations,
variety of "grass roots" small claims disputes. See Steele, Two Approaches for Contem-
porary Dispute Behavior and Consumer Problems, 1I LAW & Soc'Y REv. 667 (1977).
The practice is also spreading to criminal prosecutions. See Rice, Mediation and Arbitration
as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice System - An Overview and Legal Analysis,
29 AM. U. L. REV. 17 (1979). Even disputes with public agencies are now considered
viable mediation cites. See, e.g., Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). In addition to the disparate substantive contexts in
which mediators operate, there is also variation in the institutional contexts in which
mediators operate. Some mediators are in private practice, some are adjuncts to court
diversion programs, and others may be volunteers in neighborhood justice centers. As a
result, the outlook and training of mediators may vary widely.
See, Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American
Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1878-81 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Sultans].
4. See infra p. 6.
5. Several writers and commentators have suggested approaches to the regulation of
mediator practice. Some commentators have characterized the problem as one of "ac-
countability" and have suggested various certifications of regulatory schemes. See. Susskind,
Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981), but
see, Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind,
6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981). Other writers have been more concerned with the probable
response of courts to liability suits against mediators. See Chaykin, supra note 1. See
also MEDIATION. supra note 2, at 244-89. One recent commentator has criticized previous
approaches and has attempted to discover a limited tort model based on the mediator's
duty to safeguard "the contractarian process." Note, Sultans, supra note 3, at 1886. The
author argues that previous accountability models, like the fiduciary duty model and the
"substantive responsibility model" are flawed because they fail to account for the diverse
settings in which mediators may operate. Id. at 1882-83, 1886. Actually, although both
models have limitations, lack of flexibility to institutional variation is not one of them.
First, Susskind never attempted to present a model of general applicability; he was
specifically interested in the special problems of environmental mediation. See Susskind,
supra note 3, at 6. Susskind argued that in environmental disputes, mediators had to take
care to assure the interests of unrepresented third parties, and make other efforts to assure
that public interests are met. He then suggested that environmental mediators should
have certain credentials, id. at 42, have links to relevant regulatory agencies, id. at 43,
and assure that the public is well informed, id. at 44. Although Susskind's views are
subject to criticism on the basis that he misperceives the role of the environmental
mediator, see Stulberg, supra note 4, it is not fair to criticise his model for lack of
flexibility to institutional variation. Criticism of the fiduciary model for lack of flexibility
is similarly perplexing. Note, Sultans, supra note 3, at 1883-84. The commentator argues
that (1) the fiduciary approach is not flexible enough to accommodate the needs of court
or neighborhood mediators, and (2) the fiduciary model will result in draconian liability
where a more limited "restitutional" theory would do. Id. at 1877, 1888. The author
seriously underestimates the flexibility of fiduciary duties, and the pressure under the law
of fiduciaries toward the kind of equitable, "restitutional" accommodations the author
craves. "Courts necessarily employ flexible standards in determining whether a fiduciary
relationship exists." Chaykin, supra note 1, at 748. In fact, in my article on fiduciary
duties, I provided at least one example of a situation where modification on the mediated
agreement, without any mediator liability, would be the preferred result. Id. at 758-59.
The more accurate and trenchant criticism of the fiduciary model is not that it goes too
far and is inflexible, but rather that it will allow too many mediators to escape liability
because some courts are reluctant to find fiduciary duties. Id. at 748 n.84.
The Sultans article argues for some kind of tort liability model based on impartiality,
non-coerciveness, and thoroughness. These concepts bear a disturbing similarity to duties
discerned by previous writers such as "the duties to be evenhanded and unbiased,
trustworthy and diligent." Chaykin, supra note 1, at 749. Moreover, the Sultans com-
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depending upon the mediator's alleged transgressions. The most common
theory of professional liability, malpractice, does not seem to fit the
mediational context without extensive customization. Most notably, the
role of the mediator renders traditional tort analyses difficult 6 because
it is difficult to discern exactly which standard of care should apply to
the mediator or how a mediator can cause harm. Furthermore, even if
the causation problem can be managed, there is still difficulty in proving
damages against a mediator - an essential element of tort liability.
7
Given the difficulty of analyzing the liability issues, analysis of the
legal status of mediators is speculative and depressing. Those of us who
work in the field of alternative dispute resolution find discussions of
mediator liability threatening and counterproductive. 8 There are very
few reported cases that even remotely deal with mediator liability,9 even
though various forms of mediation have been used for a long time.'0
The threshold question is why discuss mediator liability at all, much
less think about model legislation to regulate mediator liability.
The use of mediation is on the rise." The recent alternative dispute
resolution movement did not invent mediation, but the vigorous interest
in mediation has led to the application of mediation techniques in a
mentator focuses only on the proximate cause issue, arguing that courts should consider
the impact on neighborhood mediators in its analysis of proximate cause. Note, Sultans,
supra note 3, at 1892-93. Strangely, in his analysis of this impact, the author never
considered the availability of liability insurance. The author also never considered the
more direct solution of immunity for mediators operating in a judicial capacity. See infra
p.9.
Most importantly, however, the Sultans note presents an hysterical reaction to the
possibility of mediator liability. Because of problems related to proof and causation, which
were skirted in the Sultans note, the possibilities of any mediator being held liable are
e~tremely slim. See infra p. 18. Neighborhood justice centers and court adjunct mediators
may have even more protection as a result of their greater claims to immunity. See infra
p. 79. To the extent these institutional actors are at risk, and considering that the cost
of insurance could arguably drive them out of business, states can grant the necessary
tort immunity should society deem them important enough to forego the opportunity to
sue them for their wrongs (all questionable assumptions embraced in the Sultans article).
6. See infra p. 27-33.
7. See infra note 93.
8. After all, one of the main ideas of mediation is to avoid external, coercive
decisionmaking. Many mediators have expressed their discomfort with litigation. See, e.g.,
0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 85-92 (1978), MEDIA-
TION supra note 2.
9. In fact, the only case that bears a semblance to a lawsuit against a mediator for
professional negligence is Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981). See infra
p. 25.
10. See C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 19-21 (1986) for a concise treatment
of the history of mediation.
11. At least it appears that there is an increasing interest in mediation and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution. Many new scholarly journals and newsletters devote
themselves to mediation and dispute resolution. Alternative dispute resolution centers have
been launched at several universities, and many new practitioners appear to be entering
the field. See A.B.A. DIRECTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGENCIES (1984).
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great number of disputes in a growing array of dispute contexts.' 2 Given
this trend, and given the emotional, 3 hostile nature of some of the
dispute contexts in which mediators are now operating, 4 it may only
be a matter of time before more cases are reported in which 'Mediators
are being sued. 5 The complex contours of the mediator's legal status
make it reasonable to chart some of the likeliest hazards along the way.
As these hazards become better understood, courts and legislators may
be better able to plan for them. Even if the environment does not favor
model legislation, lawyers, judges, and mediators who face liability cases
will need some understanding of the basic issues with which they will
be confronted. In this way, mediators can take measures to reduce their
risks, and if litigation does occur, courts will be in a position to make
sensible decisions.
Finally, the propriety of model legislation, especially as it pertains
to mediator immunity, is like any other political issue. Legal analysis
itself does not provide the answer. The need for model legislation depends
very much on the values that the decisionmaker brings to the subject.
It is my view that mediation can flourish without special immunities.
The common law leaves mediators exposed to liability in a very narrow
range of circumstances.
B. Structure and Format
Throughout the discussion of the various theories of mediator liability,
it is important to remember that the main purpose of civil liability is
to assure compensation to those injured by others.' 6 The existence of
civil liability can often have a salutory impact on an industry, assuring
that certain levels of quality are maintained in the industry or that
12. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Chaykin, supra note 1, at 731 n.4.
13. Family mediation is the most obvious example. In this field, parties who may have
little experience in negotiation attempt to settle financial, emotional, and family issues
that lie at the core of personal identity. Under these circumsances, it would not be
surprising to find the parties channel some of their hostility toward the family mediator.
14. See Saposnek, Mediating Child Custody Disputes, 23-24 (1983) [hereinafter,
Saposnek]. "Each spouse's self-concept, lifestyle, moral values, competence as a parent,
worth as a human being, and feelings of being lovable are threatened." Id.
15. This probability is enhanced by the fact that there appears to be some very poor
mediation practices in the field. For instance, in one account, family mediators working
as adjuncts to the Washington, D.C. municipal court system, handled a case of domestic
violence without ever mentioning the issue of spousal abuse in the ultimate agreement.
Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, at 57-65 (1984). It appears that only
one of the two co-mediators met with each party in private caucuses. Id. at 59. This is
generally considered poor mediation practice which can create distrust and place each
co-mediator in an advocacy role for "her party." Lecture by B. Mayer and M.M. Golten,
Effective Mediation Workshop in Boulder, Colo., (July 12, 1986).
16. See, e.g., Note, Sultans, supra note 3, at 1894 (recognizing the need to curtail
"unbridled mediator discretion" with judicious application of tort liability).
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adherence to certain minimal professional standards of quality is main-
tained. 7 Viewed from this perspective, the threat of civil liability is not
necessarily an undesirable goal. Civil liability may lead to improvements
in the quality of mediators who remain in the profession, the quality
of services performed, and the development of standards to regulate the
field.
On the other hand, in certain contexts, liability can have a negative
impact on an industry. Depending on the availability of insurance," and
the ability of actors in the industry to guard against liability, the fear
of civil liability can have a demoralizing impact. One thesis of this
paper is that to a large extent, the common law has done a good job
in defining the line between "good and bad" liability. The problem is
that the common law standards for immunity and liability do not translate
easily to the mediator area until there is some understanding of the
underlying purposes of the common law rules and their possible appli-
cation depending on the particular mediational context. Some of the
liability issues, on the other hand, are not too difficult. For this reason,
I have divided the analysis into the following four groups:
1. Liabilities that a mediator may be exposed to that are similar to
. the liabilities that any business actor might face.
2. Liability pertaining directly to the practice of mediation in which
causation and damages are not a difficult barrier to a finding of
liability.'9
3. Liabilities pertaining directly to the practice of mediation in which
the problems of causation and damages make a finding of liability
more difficult.
4. Liabilities that a mediator may face by causing harm to third
parties who are not participants in the mediation.
At least nine theories of liability can apply to mediators. These are:
(I) false advertising, (2) breach of contract, (3) tortious interference
with contract or business relations, (4) fraud, (5) invasion of privacy,
(6) defamation, (7) outrageous conduct, (8) breach of fiduciary duty,
(9) malpractice or professional negligence.2 0 Of all these theories, only
17. See PROSSER. supra note 2, at 25-26. "The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing
future harm has been quite important in the field of torts .... When the decisions of
the courts become known, and defendants realize they may be held liable, there is of
course a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm." Id. at 25.
18. The availability of mediator insurance is somewhat uncertain, but it does appear
that insurance companies are willing to write this kind of professional insurance coverage.
Many mediators are covered by other professional liability insurance, such as legal
malpractice insurance. The author has discovered that there are some insurance companies
willing to insure mediators.
19. We might refer to these as "independently tortious" acts or "independent wrongs."
See Chaykin, supra note 1, at 936 n.27. "For example, a mediator who purposely causes
emotional distress to a client may be liable under a theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress." Id.
20. Most of the theories of liability on this list come from MEDIATION, supra note 2
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breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, and, to a lesser extent,
breach of contract and fraud, require extensive discussion. This is so
because the law in the other fields of liability is well developed, and
can be easily translated to the mediation context without much difficulty.
This is not as true for the theories of professional malpractice, which
are the most flexible and useful of all the theories available. I will
therefore devote the greatest attention to the liability issues in Group
3 which deal with professional malpractice, and Group 4 which deal
with special issues that arise as a result of injuries to third parties. I
will also address the overlap between some theories of mediator liability
in section VI. Finally, no analysis of mediator liability is complete
without at least entertaining arguments for granting mediators some
kind of immunity from civil suits.1
C. The Immunity Issue
The last section of this Article will be devoted to the immunity issue.
It will begin with a brief discussion of immunities in general and then
explore why immunities are basically disfavored. If model legislation is
going to be promulgated, the establishment of statutory immunity would
circumvent some of the problems of professional liability of mediators.
An immunity statute protecting mediators would have to deal with two
difficult questions: (1) What is the scope of the immunity?, and (2)
Who is covered by the immunity? However, for reasons stated below,
the thesis of this Article finds insufficient evidence exists to merit the
creation of mediator immunity at this time.
The argument in favor of immunity proceeds on two fronts. Immunities
are generally granted when, by history or statute, the law recognizes
the social importance of an activity to such an extent that a decision
is made to allow those participating in that activity to continue without
the threat of a civil suit. As a result, judges have long enjoyed a broad
immunity for their acts which has enabled them to make decisions
without fear of reprisal from disappointed litigants. 22 This immunity is
absolute, excusing judges from liability for all judicial acts, even if
based upon malice. Although crucial in determining the scope of im-
munity, interpretation of the term "judicial act" has been broad.23 Some
courts define "judicial act" in a circular manner, encompassing almost
at 281. I have added tortious interference with contract to the list. This list is not complete,
but it covers most of the important issues that will be addressed in this Article.
21. See supra note 4.
22. A more complete discussion of the immunity question will be provided. See infra
p. 69-85.
23. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld judicial immunity for a state judge who had issued an order
allowing for the sterilization of a mildly retarded individual. See also, Block, Stump v.
Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879.
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any activity of the judge.24
To some extent, courts have interpreted the immunity granted to an
arbitrator more narrowly.25 Arbitrators are only immune from liability
for those acts that pertain to their decisionmaking function.26 Since
mediators do not render decisions in the same manner as arbitrators, a
strong argument exists to extend immunity to mediators under the same
rationale.27 An alternative argument is that mediators in court-ordered
referral programs should enjoy the same immunity as judges who engage
in settlement discussions. This approach presents two problems. First,
it would seem incongruous to grant court-appointed mediators immunity
while other mediators who perform the same kind of service are left
unprotected. 28 Second, the scope of a judge's immunity in settlement
discussions is unclear.
In certain contexts, judicial immunity should not apply to settlement
discussions.2 9 For example, tort immunity should not be granted to
mediators because it is unnecessary to support mediation. The costs of
granting an immunity will be borne by individual victims of mediators'
incompetence. In addition, the legal premise for juducial immunity is
much broader than necessary to achieve its purpose. Since mediators
will only face liability in a narrow range of situations, model legislation
creating an immunity is unwarranted. In fact, it might be worthwhile
to promulgate model legislation opposing mediator liability.
The next section discusses some of the liability problems mediators
may face. The inclusion of these liability theories enables mediators to
view their exposure to liability in a broader context.30
II. POTENTIAL BUSINESS TORTS
A. Liabilities that Arise from the Business of' Mediation
Not all mediators operate in a business setting, and therefore, not
all mediators will be concerned with the problem of business liability.
24. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
25. See Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
26. Id.
27. There is a complicating factor here because some mediators engage in hybrid
forms of mediation/arbitration. See infra text accompanying note 154.
28. On the other hand, it is not unusual to find that those who engage in a sanctioned
mode of public activity may enjoy privileges and benefits not shared by others who
perform a similar role in the private sector. For instance, decisionmakers in certain
governmental positions enjoy immunities that their private sector counterparts can only
wish for. Even if this line of reasoning is going to be followed, it will not require model
legislation. Courts will be able to extend the protection over their adjuncts. For further
differentiation of mediators in various institutional roles, see Note, Sultans, supra note
3.
29. This point will be discussed more fully. See infra text accompanying note 135.
30. In other words, mediator liability means much more than professional malpractice.
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Some mediators work as adjuncts to court programs, or are hired as
governmental agents. It is the mediators in private practice who are
subject to some of the same constraints as purveyors of any other service.
Mediators can be liable for false advertising, breaking contracts, or
deceiving or creating false perceptions about their service. For the most
part, the fact that the transgression might have been committed by a
mediator is of little significance-the law will be the same as if the
case was filed against a plumber, for example. Still, there are unique
qualities of mediation practice that render some of these issues worthy
of brief discussion. In particular, it is important to examine liability
that can stem from false advertising or breach of contract. Other torts
that can occur in the business context, such as deception or fraud, are
more thoroughly discussed in Section III.
B. False Advertising
No action for false advertising exists at common law." The Federal
Trade Commission Act32 and various state acts that outlaw unfair and
deceptive practices have filled the void in the common law to make
any practice that has the tendency to deceive actionable. Some states
provide private rights of action against the offender,33 while others allow
the attorney general to bring an action. 4 Although these laws vary by
jurisdiction, they generally prohibit any activity that can be considered
unfair or deceptive, including the dissemination of false advertising. It
is forseeable that a mediator may violate these provisions without any
intention to do so.
1. Misleading Statements About the Services Provided
Mediators should be careful about oral and written statements they
make regarding the type of service they provide qnd its results. For
instance, when advertising "divorce mediation," mediators should be
careful to explain whether or not they are providing comprehensive
mediation and legal services which will lead to a change of marital
status. Use of the term "divorce mediation" could lead some consumers
31. B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Investment Co., 451 A.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.
1982). (False advertising was included as an element of unfair competition at common
law).
32. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
33. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10 (1985) and OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638
(1983) which allow for private rights of action for unfair and deceptive practices. See
also, McCormick Piano v. Geiger, 412 N.E.2d 842 (Ind. App. 1980); Kagan v. Gibralter
S&L Assoc., 35 Cal. 3d 582, 676 P.2d 1060, 200 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1984).
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (1983) and ALA. CODE § 8-19-1 (1975) which
allow Attorney General to bring a cause of action for unfair and deceptive practices. See
also, Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home Int'l, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012
(1981).
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D. Certain Breaches of Fiduciary Duty40
In managing a mediation business, there will be times when a mediator
will be entrusted with funds, and may take on the status of a fiduciary
in relation to those funds. 4' For instance, it is quite common for mediators
to require parties to place money on account with the mediation service,
similar to a retainer paid an attorney, to cover the first several hours
of mediation.42 A mediator might also request that the parties place
disputed funds or property in escrow with the mediator until the dispute
is resolved. In such situations, where the mediator has been entrusted
with funds, he acts as a fiduciary with regard to those funds. 43 The
mediator must not convert those funds to his own use, hypothecate or
invest them, or commingle them with other funds.44 If clients make
advance payments to a mediator for professional services to be rendered,
funds should only be transferred to the mediator's private account as
those services are provided. 45 This aspect of the mediator's fiduciary
duty is not controversial.
Although some mediators may want to avoid a role in which they
act as an escrow agent or trustee, the fact is that mediators who do
perform these roles can expect to be held responsible if they violate
the trust.46
III. "ROUTINE" MEDIATION TORTS
Mediators may further be subject to a group of torts that appear to
be related to the practice of mediation but present few difficult legal
issues. The best examples of this are if a mediator is sued for defamation,
invasion of privacy, or even battery. Damages for such torts are in no
way related to the mediation itself; the assessment of damages is
independent of the mediation. 47 As a result, the legal analysis of liability
40. See, Chaykin, supra note 1; See infra text accompanying notes 89-95.
41. Mediators may hold clients'funds for a variety of reasons. For example, mediators
following Coogler's recommendation for conducting family mediations will require the
client deposit funds to cover the first few mediations. See Coogler, supra note 8, at 120.
42. Id.
43. See Chaykin, supra note 1, at n.95.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Chaykin, supra note I, at nn.42-52 and 93-95.
47. See Chaykin, supra note 1, at n.27 and accompanying text. One could also include
fraud in this list. It should be remembered that in order to establish a case of fraud, the
plaintiff must prove that defendant (1) made a false representation (2) knowing that it
was false (3) with an intent that plaintiff would rely on the statement, (4) that plaintiff
justifiably relied on the statement and (5) was damaged as a result. See PROSSER. supra
note 2, at 728. Given the difficulty of proving fraud, it does not deserve great attention
in this Article, especially since there is nothing about the law of fraud that is peculiar
to mediators.
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is similar to the analysis applied in any other defamation or invasion
of privacy suit.
There are, however, a few wrinkles that merit discussion of these
particular torts under a separate heading. Whereas the liabilities dis-
cussed above stem mainly from the management and operation of a
mediation business, liabilities discussed in this section may arise during
the mediation itself, and therefore, a strong argument may exist that
mediators should be shielded from some of these liabilities by mediator
immunity. 4 In addition, given the fact that many of these torts will
derive from utterances made by a mediator engaged in mediation, many
issues of mediator confidentiality and privilege also arise.4 9 Consider the
following:
Mediator is conducting a marital mediation between H and W. H is a
well-known movie star and W is an international model. As a result, the
divorce has attracted a great deal of popular attention. The mediation is
successful in that an agreement is reached. However, H has made it clear
that he finds the agreement "onerous, and only acceptable as a matter
of expediency." W calls M and says that, given H's attitude, she fears
that H will not comply with the shared custody provisions in the agreement.
H tries to reassure her, but there are signs that the agreement will fail.
A reporter calls M to confirm reports that the agreement is in trouble.
M is reluctant to respond, but finally confirms the report. He is quoted
as saying, "the whole problem is unnecessary. W is in a panic because
H never keeps his word on anything, but this agreement has been structured
so that even a backpeddling egomaniac like H will have to keep in line."
H sues M for defamation claiming that M has called him a habitual liar,
and that this statement is untrue, defamatory, and has caused him damage.
Clearly, M did not handle this problem with great skill. Examining
the law of defamation as it now stands, there is a good chance that M
will have a protracted law suit on his hands. H will argue that M made
a statement that was (1) false and (2) defamatory,50 because it subjected
him to scorn and ridicule in the community. 51 M may have various
defenses, including arguments that the statement was true,52 that H was
48. For a discussion of mediator immunity see infra p. 69-85.
49. A discussion of mediator confidentiality is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
discussion of mediator confidentiality see Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation.
98 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1984); Comment, In the Wake of Tarasoff" Mediation and the
Duty to Disclose. 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 209 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Wake of
TarasofJ]; and Green, A Heretical View. infra note 127 and accompanying text.
50. More particularly, the elements of a cause of action for defamation are (1)
publication of defamatory words that are (2) false and uttered with (3) malice (express
or implied). See, e.g., Juneau v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 482 So. 2d 1022 (La. Ct.
App. 1986); Bill Partin Jewelry, Inc. v. Smith, 467 So. 2d 188 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
51. Tartaglia v. Townsend, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 477 N.E.2d 178 (1985) (defamatory
words expose plaintiff to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule). Accord PROSSER. supra
note 2, at 780-85.
52. See, e.g., Brown University v. Kirsh, 757 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1985).
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to the conclusion that they will get a divorce as a result of hiring the
service. It may be a rude awakening if the consumer then realizes that
there will be additional charges for the legal fees involved in obtaining
a separation agreement. Because mediation services are new to many
people, it is important to be explicit about what that particular mediation
service provides.
2. Statements of Qualifications
Mediators must also avoid inflating their qualifications in advertising.
Mediators should give an honest account of their years of experience,
education, and special training. Although it is difficult to see the damage
of inflated credentials, false advertising claims do not require damages.
Enforcement actions may be brought as long as the activity is deceptive.3 5
In some situations, the wrongdoer has been required to correct the
advertisement.3 6 Although this action is embarrassing, it is not as effective
as direct liability.
C. Breach of Contract
Not all mediations are conducted under mediation service contracts,
but most mediators use written contracts.3 7 As with most agreements,
a contract to mediate can be written or oral; the terms can be expressed
or implied. The obvious point is that contracts to mediate, which are
intended to protect the mediator and educate the participants, may also
provide a theory of liability against the mediator. Mediators must be
sure that such agreements clearly delineate their responsibilities, ac-
curately describe the scope of the dispute, and provide for methods of
terminating the mediation, if a mediated settlement is not reached.
Unless this contingency is covered, a mediator is in danger of becoming
a prisoner to the mediation.
It is important to remember that contract law provides the mediator
with protection.38 A well-drafted contract should reflect the parties'
expectations of the mediator's performance. It is only when these ex-
pectations are defeated, due to lack of performance by the mediator,
35. See, e.g., OIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4165.03 (Page Supp. 1985) (proof of monetary
damage or loss not required for injunctive relief against deceptive trade practice).
36. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 950 (1978), (F.T.C. has the authority to require corrective advertising).
37. See, MEDIATION, supra note 2, at 339.
38. Many mediators have attempted to include exculpatory clauses in their employment
agreements. The exculpatory clause included in Folbergs & Taylor's book is typical.
"Because of the extensive participant review and revision, we agree to hold the mediator
harmless against errors, omissions, or future negative consequences stemming from the
provisions of the mediation process or the preparation of the Mediated Plan." MEDIATION,
supra note 2, at 339.
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that contract liability becomes a realistic possibility.
Generally, the contract liability that will apply to mediators is the
same as that which applies to nearly any other service provider. However,
mere breach of a contractual provision may have no legal significance
unless the plaintiff can show that the breach resulted in damages
compensable under contract law. For instance, one could envision the
following case:
M agrees to help settle a dispute between buyer (B) and seller (S)
concerning the terms for the purchase of an apartment building. B and
S have signed a purchase and sale agreement, but disagree over the
interpretation of several points in the agreement. B also contends that S
made additional promises outside the agreement, which B now repudiates.
Time is of the essence in this mediation because the purchase and sale
agreement will expire in 20 days. B and S arrive at the mediator's office
for the first session, when they learn that M will not be able to make it
that day. B and S are unable to schedule additional sessions. They later
learn that M was offered a very lucrative mediation assignment which he
accepted in spite of his conflicting obligations to B and S. Meanwhile,
the purchase and sale agreement expires, and S finds a new buyer. B
sues M for breach of contract.
In analyzing this problem, one critical issue is whether M's breach can
be deemed a cause of damage to B. The amount of damages is relatively
certain, but the causal nexus between the damage and the breach is
arguably tenuous. M will argue that B's loss was caused by S's refusal
to sell, not M's failure to mediate. M may also argue that the mediation
might have failed, in which case, his breach made no difference. Many
of these problems dovetail with issues that arise in the causation analysis
of professional malpractice.39 For now, it is sufficient to recognize that
contract law is a potential source of liability in the business of mediation.
39. The relevant tort and contract concepts share important similarities. Using the
Buyer and Seller hypothetical which was discussed above, it is quite obvious that under
the law of contracts, the plaintiff would be entitled to compensatory damages. In this
case, compensatory damages would include any monies paid to the mediator, and any
other out-of-pocket expenses laid out in preparation for the mediation. Here, the law of
damages attempts to "place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he would
have had if the contract had been performed." CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS 521
(1977). Consequential damages more closely resemble tort damages. They include damages
that (1) "may fairly and reasonably be considered ... arising naturally ... and (2) such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties ... "
Id. at 523-24 (quoting the court in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854)).
The analysis can get more technical in that the first variety of damages is referred to
as general consequential damages, while the second type is considered to be special
consequential damages. Id. at 524-25. Of course, a prime concern in consequential damages
cases is the foreseeability of the harm. Id. at 522, (sub-chapter D (Foreseeability)). This
is also a general consideration employed in tort law to determine whether a given harm
was the proximate cause of a defendant's actions. See infra text accompanying note 1.
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a public figure, and that M did not make the statement with knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of its truth.53
H may also sue M for invasion of privacy by claiming that the
divorce mediation was a private matter and that M intruded upon that
privacy by making those statements. M may also have some defenses
to this theory of liability. The problem with M's defenses is that many
of them can only be effective when resolved by a finder of fact in
protracted litigation. In other words, the mediator will have a long,
painful fight on his hands, even if he eventually prevails. On the other
hand, the attractiveness of the immunity is that if the mediator asserts
that his actions are protected by mediator immunity and his statements
to the reporter were privileged he can avoid a law suit.
IV. LIABILITY ISSUES WITH SPECIAL PROBLEMS
Professional malpractice is the most obvious and important type of
liability that can be directed against mediators.14 Lawyers generally
perceive malpractice actions as negligence suits against professionals
who have fallen below an accepted minimal level of care for practitioners
in that field." If the practitioner's failure to adhere to that standard
can be shown to have caused provable damages to a plaintiff, then an
action for professional negligence may be successful. 6
Unfortunately, some severe problems arise when the law of professional
malpractice is applied to mediators. First, because it can be argued that
mediation is more of an art than a science,57 it is difficult to prove that
a given action by a mediator has fallen below minimal professional
standards.5 There is little agreement as to what minimally competent
mediation practice entails.59 This issue is further complicated by the
fact that mediators operate in many different contexts which often vary
widely in degree of formality and sophistication of participants. 60 Fur-
53. See, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A full-scale discussion of
the law of defamation is beyond the scope of this paper.
54. See, MEDIATION. supra note 2, at 281. The authors suggest that the two most
likely theories of liability are "breach of contract and professional malpractice." Id. They
recognize that many contractual problems can be avoided through the use of an Employment
Agreement and Mediation Guidelines. Id. at 282-83. They then note that: "Mediator
liability based on allegations of professional negligence, or malpractice, is the liability
claim most likely to be encountered by a mediator." Id. at 283.
55. See PROSSER. supra note 2, at 185-93.
56. See generally, Note, Torts - Medical Malpractice - Rejection of the "But for'"
Test, 45 N.C.L. REV. 799 (1967).
57. "First, mediators themselves disagree about whether mediation is an art or a
science. Many mediators believe that their practice is closer to an art form and have
been reluctant to encourage, or have actively resisted systematic study of what they do."
Moore, supra note 10, at X (Preface).
58. See Chaykin, supra note 1, at n.25.
59. Id.
60. More specifically, mediators now operate in family, labor, and business settings,
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thermore, even if the standard of care can be ascertained, and that
standard of care is clearly breached, it will be difficult to demonstrate
to a court that a mediator has caused provable, non-speculative damages
because of the structure of most mediations. 61 Many of these problems
are well illustrated by the case of Lange v. Marshall.62
In Lange, a husband and wife seeking divorce sought an attorney
named Marshall to represent them. 63 The attorney, who was friendly
with both parties, said that he would be unwilling to represent one
spouse against the other, but that he would represent them jointly if
they could agree on the terms of the dissolution.64 Shortly thereafter,
the wife entered the psychiatric ward of a hospital for treatment of
depression arising from her marital problems. 65 Her husband and the
as well as in governmental regulatory arenas. Within each one of these areas, there are
many kinds of issues that might require mediation. Mediation techniques might vary
depending on the kind of issue being mediated. In addition, there are many different
notions as to the best way to approach mediation problems. There is little agreement as
to what a mediator should do in various contexts. Model codes of ethics, to the extent
they exist, tend to provide aspirations and general guidelines, with little specific information
as to what a mediator should do in a given situation. See, Bishop, The Standards of
Practice for Family Mediators: An Individual Interpretation and Comments, 17 FAM. L.Q. 461 (1984); Moore, supra note 10, at 299-309. In addition, standards of practice may
vary in different institutional contexts. See Note, Sultans, supra note 3.
61. In order to fulfill the elements of a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove not
only that the defendant has breached his duty of care, but that there was harm caused
by the defendant's breach. The concept of causation in torts is generally viewed as having
two components; (1) causation in fact and (2) proximate cause. The cause-in-fact component
focuses on whether A caused damage to B in some logical sense. The obvious problem
is that, metaphysically, all events can trace their cause back into history. In order for
the cause in fact test to have some meaning, courts have developed some limiting concepts.
Some courts still ask whether the damage would have occurred "but for" defendant's
negligence. As we will see, there are several problems with the "but for" test. Particularly,
it is not very helpful when there is more than one identifiable or possible cause of
plaintiff's damage. Many courts have opted for a test that asks whether defendant's
negligence is a "significant factor" as a cause of plaintiff's damages. Although the
"significant factor" test may not solve all our problems, it may be the best we can do
right now. The "proximate cause" component is closely related to concepts of defendant's
duty and society's judgment as to whether logically causal activity committed by defendant
should be actionable. The concept is related to the duty of defendant, becuase we are
asking whether defendant should be responsible for these particular consequences, given
the nature of his role and activities. The focus will often be on whether the harm to the
plaintiff was "foreseeable" or "natural" or "a direct cause of defendant's act." But see
Note, Sultans. supra note 3, at 1892 for a controversial, and somewhat perplexing,
proximate cause analysis. The author notes that the factors he employs, most notably the
monetary impact on the mediation program, "are not the factors commonly reviewed in
proximate cause analysis." Id. The author continues the analysis apparently unconcerned
with the fact that the cases do not recognize such considerations as relevant to the
proximate cause analysis. All of this amounts to a judgment as to whether or not the
defendant should be responsible for the kind of damage plaintiff incurred, given defendant's
acts.
62. 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. id.
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lawyer visited the hospital where the dissolution agreement was finally
negotiated.6 6 The husband and wife filed a joint petition for dissolution,
which the circuit judge took "under submission," indicating that he
would issue a final order in 30 days. 67
During this time, the wife had second thoughts, obtained her own
attorney, and took the matter "off submission. ' '68 After protracted ne-
gotiations and extensive discovery, the parties reached a new agreement
which was somewhat more favorable to the wife than the previous
submission. 69 Thereafter, the wife sued Marshall claiming that he failed
to "(1) inquire as to the financial state of Ralph Lange and advise
plaintiff; (2) negotiate for a better settlement for plaintiff; (3) advise
plaintiff that she would get a better settlement if she litigated the
matter; and (4) fully and fairly disclose to plaintiff her rights as to
marital property, custody, and maintenance. ' 70 As damages, plaintiff
claimed the loss of ten months maintenance payments and compensation
for apartment rent, taxes, legal fees, and fees paid to accountants and
private investigators who helped prepare for the litigation.7' The jury
found for the plaintiff, awarded her $74,000, and defendant appealed. 72
The appellate court was confronted with competing characterizations
of the case. The plaintiff argued that defendant was liable for professional
malpractice as an attorney. 73 Marshall defended on the grounds that he
was acting as a mediator, and that the normal standards regulating
attorney malpractice were not relevant to this situation.74 In other words,
defendant argued that he was not negligent as an attorney because he
was not acting as an attorney.
A. The Standard of Care
If the appellate court had confronted Marshall's defense,75 that he
was acting as a mediator and not as an attorney, it would have been
required to decide whether to apply the traditional standard of negligence
for attorneys or a special standard for mediators. Assuming that the
court decided that Marshall had been acting as a mediator, and that
the rules for attorney malpractice were not decisive,76 it should have
66. Id. at 238.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 239.
72. Id. at 237.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id.
75. The Lange court never addressed this issue because it found no proof of damages.
See infra text accompanying note 86.
76. The standards of practice for attorney/mediators have been a subject of ongoing
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remanded the case on the issue of whether Marshall was negligent as
a mediator. This question of whether Marshall had violated the standard
of care is generally an issue of fact for the jury." In order to conclude
that Marshall's conduct fell below accepted standards, the jury needed
some evidence from which it could have determined what a reasonably
competent, mediator would have done in Marshall's position. 8 As I
debate. See Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16
FANi. L. Q. 107 (1982); Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L. Q.
219 (1982); Folberg & Taylor, Mediation 351-52 (1984); Riskin, Toward New Standards
for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 392 (1984). More precisely,
commentators have been worried about three major questions: (1) Can an attorney act
as a mediator without running afoul of his professional obligations as an attorney? (2)
Can an attorney give legal advice when he is acting as a mediator? (3) If the answers
to the first two questions are "yes," then by what standards of malpractice liability should
an attorney/mediator be judged? These issues are most sensitively handled in Riskin's
"New Standards" article, in which he argues that since lawyers have unique skills and
talents as mediators they must have the freedom to give legal advice when they act as
mediators. Riskin, supra at 336. After attempting to work around the ethical problems
by arguing that a lawyer, acting as a mediator, is not representing either party and is
therefore not subject to the existing rules of professional responsibility, id. at 345-353,
he suggests new standards based on the duty to "foster a fair agreement and ... to
'maximize' interests." Id. at 353. Finally, Riskin suggests that under these new "standards"
an attorney/mediator would rarely be found liable for violations of the fairness standard,
and even if the standard was violated, it would be difficult to prove causation and damages.
Id. at 360.
On the other hand, Riskin notes that: It is easier to envision how a neutral lawyer
might be held liable for failing to adequately foster material interests. A neutral
lawyer who failed to tell the couple about the tax advantages of alimony over
child support, . . . probably would have breached his duty to exercise reasonable
care to help the participants maximize their assets .... Id.
Riskin then explains that even here it would be difficult, but not impossible, to marshall
adequate proof of causation and damages to hold the neutral lawyer liable. Id. at 360-
61. 1 believe that Riskin's analysis is generally correct, although I disagree with the thrust
of it, and find some of his proposed standards too vague, and probably unnecessary, to
perform an adequate negligence analysis. If neutral attorneys can give legal opinions
during a mediation (and that is a big "if" given the client loyalty requirements of the
Code of Professional Responsibility), I am quite certain that the lawyer will be subject
to ordinary rules of negligence if that opinion turns out to be incorrect. In fact, cases in
which a mediator begins to use expert knowledge during mediation that go beyond his
expert procedural knowledge as a mediator, present the best possibility for a malpractice
action. When a neutral gives legal advice, he takes himself out of the relatively standard-
free area of procedural judgment, and enters the standard-laden arena of the lawyer, the
doctor, or the architect. When operating in that environment, the neutral will be subject
to the traditional standards of that profession. A neutral attorney who argues that "the
advice was bad because I had divided loyalties" will not be in a strorig position. In that
instance, the neutral attorney should either advise the parties to get their own attorneys'
opinions or disclose his problem to the parties.
77. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.
1968) (whether the required standard of care was exercised by architect is a question for
a jury).
78. Id. at 478 (verdict upheld where there was some evidence of the applicable standard
of care, but it is not extensive).
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mentioned above, this task represents significant problems for plaintiff.
First, the exact contours of the relationship between mediator and
client are highly individualized and variable, depending upon the dispute
involved and the services that the mediator has agreed to provide. For
instance, plaintiff alleged that Marshall failed to inquire into Ralph
Lange's financial state. In some family mediation contexts, mediators
specifically agree to take on the task of assuring the exchange of relevant
information.79 In other contexts, a mediator might only act as a facilitator
to help the parties find their way through a dispute based on the
information that they share at that time. Similarly, it is not unusual
for a mediator to bring expertise to an area and to advise the parties
of the relevant facts or considerations. It is just as usual for mediators
to insist that the parties provide their own experts, and that any opinions
expressed as by the mediator are purely advisory. In other words, in
some mediation contexts, a mediator may be deemed to have a duty
to provide reasonably accurate and reliable advice or information, while
in another context, he may be viewed merely as a coordinator of meetings
and an enforcer of decorum.s0
It becomes difficult, therefore, to define a consistent standard against
which a mediator's professional behavior can be measured. This problem
is much more severe than the one faced by plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases where different medical specialties are charged with
varying levels of skill and knowledge."s Each specialty has a relatively
defined body of knowledge with generally accepted medical standards
for handling specific medical problems. This degree of uniformity and
consistency does not yet exist among mediators,82 even when they work
in the same general area of mediation practice. 3 Indeed, because so
much of the mediative art is a matter of judgment, this consistency
may never develop.84
79. See Coogler, supra note 8, at 122. "Each party shall fully disclose... all information
... if the mediator finds that the disclosure is appropriate to the mediation process and
may aid the parties in reaching settlement." Id.
80. As I noted earlier, see supra note 76, when a mediator does give expert advice,
it is most probable that the neutral will be held to the normal standards of negligence
for that profession. See, e.g., Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 478 A.2d 397 (1984),
in which the court held that aicountants which had been appointed as "impartial experts,"
id. at 398, to render a valuation of a business asset so that the marital estate could be
equitably distributed, enjoyed no special immunities and could be found liable to plaintiffs
under the ordinary standards of accountancy. Id. at 400.
81. C.f., Chaykin, supra note 1, at 736 n.28.
82. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that mediators are often trained in a
wide variety of disciplines and often approach mediation with allegiance to other professions.
For instance, when an attorney acts as a mediator, should he be subject to the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, some modified standards for attorney/mediators,
or the same standards that "any mediator" would face? See Riskin, supra note 76.
83. Id. at 735, nn.23-24.
84. Happily, some leading mediators are successfully demystifying the process, clearing
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Furthermore, even though some organizations are developing general
guidelines for mediation, 5 most decisions a mediator makes are an
exercise of informed judgement. For example, there is broad debate
among mediators concerning the extent to which a mediator's goal
should be settlement as opposed to internal fairness. Absent contractual,
ethical or statutory guidelines, a mediator who fails to promote a full
exchange of information may consider himself justified by the fact that
he promoted agreement. If that is the goal, the mediator's passivity
with regard to information exchange may not be considered negligent.
B. Causation and Damages
It is probable that, in the right context, a plaintiff may still be able
to demonstrate that a mediator has fallen below the applicable standard
of care. The contract between the mediator and the parties, the applicable
code of professional behavior, and even relevant case books or articles
may help determine the appropriate standard of care. Cases in which
the mediator fails to fulfill an obligation that is relatively concrete
provide the best cases for liability. For instance, if in Lange it could
be found that Marshall had an obligation to help with the exchange of
information, but did nothing, then a strong case for mediator liability
would exist. Another example is where a mediator gives "expert advice"
on the tax implications of a certain agreement, and he is wrong.
the way for ascertainment of minimal professional standards. See Moore, supra note 10,
at 52.
By claiming that they respond differently to each conflict or by arguing that
mediation is an art form rather than a series of scientific interventions, some
mediators shroud their practice in secrecy and leave their disputants ignorant of
the mediation process ....
Clouding the mediation process has been sharply criticized ... and I advocate
a candid education of the parties about the general mediation procedures that
might be used in their dispute. Id.
Although standards for procedural expertise are still developing, standards for substantive
opinion giving are rather well developed. Where an attorney neutral gives legal advice,
or an architect neutral gives an architectural opinion, or where a therapist neutral provides
psychiatric evaluations or therapy, that neutral will most probably be subject to the
substantive standards of that expertise. This is probably part of the reason why most
proposed mediator codes forbid neutrals trained in other disciplines from practicing their
substantive expertise during mediation. See id. at 303 (Code of Professional Conduct)
["Mediators are not lawyers. At no time shall a mediator offer legal advice to parties in
a dispute .... This same code of conduct applies to mediators who are themselves trained
in the law."]. But see Riskin, supra note 76, and ALLISON AND TAYLOR MEDIATION 352
(1984). Obviously, the argument as to whether or not a lawyer/mediator should give legal
advice is still open to question. My point is that if the neutral lawyer does so, he will
face a greater threat of liability for any errors in professional judgment.
85. Id. at 736, n.29. See also, CPR Offers Model Rules of Business Mediation, supra
note 2.
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Liability is most improbable where mediators use their professional
judgment to structure the dispute resolution process. It would be hard
to demonstrate that a mediator breached the standard of care by
prematurely declaring an impasse on a particular issue, or settling the
negotiation in a way in which one of the parties disagreed. However,
even if the standard of care issue can sometimes be satisfied, the
problems of causation and damages remain.
In actuality, the court in Lange v. Marshall did not have to decide
whether the defendant was acting as a mediator or as an attorney.
6
Instead, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove any
damage resulted from the defendant's actions.8 7 Essentially, the Lange
court found that any conclusion that the husband would have agreed
to a more favorable settlement with the wife but for the mediator's
actions was totally speculative.8 The court relied on cases which hold
that damages in a negligence action must be proven, and cannot be
conjectural. 89 Because of the lack of proven damages, the court was
able to reverse the judgement of the lower court and vacate the jury's
verdict. 0
The decision by the court in Lange illustrates some of the most
difficult problems associated with the analysis of mediator liability. First,
because of the very nature of the mediative setting, the ultimate decision
to enter into an agreement and resolve the dispute ostensibly remains
with the parties, not the mediator. Consequently, there is a strong
argument that, from a tort perspective, the mediator has no responsibility
at all. Proponents of this view would suggest that since the mediator
functions merely as a facilitator, he is not responsible for damages
resulting from either party's decision to enter into an agreement.
Two ways exist to characterize this argument from a legal perspective.
Because of the nature of mediation, the mediator has no duty to perform
as a reasonably competent mediator. A better view is that, although
the mediator might have some duty to behave in a reasonably competent
manner, in most situations, failure to achieve that minimal standard
will not be deemed to have a causal relation to any damages that
result.9'
86. 622 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. App. 1981).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id. at 238.
90. Id.
91. As I noted earlier, causation in torts has two components: cause in fact and
proximate cause. See supra text accompanying note 47. The better view is that "cause
in fact" is established if plaintiff can show that defendant's conduct was a "substantial
factor" in the causation of damages. See PROSSER. supra note 2, at 267; see also Note,
Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "But For" Test, 45 N.C.L. REv. 799 (1967). The
Lange court seems to have gotten hung up on the cause in fact issue because it adopted
a strict "but for" approach to the problem. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 239
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One corollary to this argument might be that the intentional acts of
the parties themselves are superior to any activity on the part of the
mediator that may have fallen below minimal standards of competence.
This argument is similar to many traditional tort cases in which a
defendant's negligent act is excused by the intervening and supervening
activity of another actor.12 For instance, the traditional tort rule is that
plaintiffs cannot collect for criminal acts of third parties that might
result from a minor negligent act on the part of the defendant.93 It is
for this reason that proprietors of businesses are generally not responsible
for batteries committed in the parking lots of their establishments, unless
they have some reason to know that there is specific danger in their
parking lots. 94 It may also be argued that a mediator is not responsible
for the damage caused by his own negligence where both parties in-
tentionally and voluntarily entered into the agreement.
Most of the cases dealing with intentional intervening, acts, however,
rely on the concept that an intentional criminal act is a relatively
unforeseeable result of the defendant's conduct. 95 In the context of a
mediation, it is entirely foreseeable that if the mediator fails to perform
his duties in accordance with minimal professional standards, damages
may result. The foreseeability of this consequence may vary depending
(Mo. App. 1981). The proximate cause issue is more closely related to the forseeability
of the harm. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 280. "If one could not reasonably foresee
any injury as the result of one's act, or if one's conduct was reasonable in the light of
what one could anticipate, there would be no negligence, and no liability." Id. But see
Note, Sultans, supra note 3, at 1892 for an unorthodox view of proximate cause. The
issue of proximate cause is difficult to discuss in general terms. In certain situations,
however, it will be difficult for the mediator to argue that harm resulting to his client
was an unforeseeable consequence of his negligence. See id. at 1892, n.6.
92. Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 531 F.2d 1100 (Ist Cir. 1976) (defendant is relieved of
liability by a superseding cause of the accident which he could not reasonably be found
to foresee); Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 719 (8th Cir. 1976)
("[lIntervening cause is a new and independant force which so interrupts the chain of
events as to become the responsible proximate cause .... ).
93. Ferguson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 111. App. 3d 890, 290 N.E.2d 429 (1972)
(when an unforeseeable intervening act by a third person occurs, the first wrongful act
is not the proximate cause of the harm); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp.
566, 593 (1979) (intervening acts do not bar liability except possibly by intentional acts
of third parties); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1943)
(intervening act by a third person breaks the causal connection between first act and
injury).
94. Kenny v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3rd Cir. 1978) (proprietor
of business establishment is not responsible for injuries to patrons caused by criminal
conduct of third party unless reasonably foreseeable), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1978);
Doe v. United States, 718 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1983) (owner of business premises has
no duty to protect business invitee from unforeseeable criminal attack by third person).
95. Lambert v. Will Bros. Co., 596 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1979) (an independent intervening
cause is one not foreseeable to original wrongdoer); McCullough v. United States, 538
F. Supp. 694 (1982) (intervening cause must not be foreseeable to be considered such);
Millette v. Radosta, 84 Ill. App. 3d 5, 404 N.E.2d 823 (1980) (intervening cause must
not be foreseeable).
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on the context of the mediation. If the Lange case had involved a
dispute between two sophisticated business competitors in a commercial
context, both of whom are represented by lawyers, it may be difficult
to argue that any error in business advice offered by the mediator was
the proximate cause of the eventual damage.
In this kind of situation, the law will probably require plaintiffs to
exercise the special expertise they possess to protect themselves. In a
very real sense, it is the parties that are responsible for the injuries
suffered while the mediator will probably be excused from any liability.
However, in both this context and others, a jury may find that the
acts of a mediator could cause foreseeable harm to the plaintiffs. It
may be that the parties in Lange were relying on the mediators to
effectuate a fair exchange of information and to provide a certain
amount of accurate legal advice. If so, the mediator's behavior did cause
damage to the plaintiff in a very real sense. Similarly, it is possible for
businesses to hire a mediator with special expertise to help settle a
dispute. If the mediator volunteers certain information which turns out
to be false, it is arguable that the mediator's failure to provide accurate
information is the cause of the damage to the plaintiff. It will often
be a question of fact for the jury as to whether damage resulted from
the mediator's activity 6 or from the failure of the parties to protect
themselves properly.
This line of reasoning resembles the old concept of assumption of
risk.97 Under more modern tort theory, it would probably be characterized
as a matter of whether the damage was caused by the mediator's failure
to conduct the mediation in accordance with the proper professional
standards, or whether the damage resulted from the plaintiff's own
negligence in entering into the agreement. Viewed from this perspective,
a strong possibility of comparative negligence exists in the area of
mediator liability.98
Assuming that a court is willing to work around the causation problems
outlined above, there remains the difficult issue of proving damages. In
negligence actions, if there are no damages there is no basis for a
96. See, Duty v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 735 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1984) (questions
raised concerning damages are resolved by a trier of fact); United States v. Harue Hayashi,
282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960) (it is the function of the jury to evaluate all evidence
produced on the question of damages); Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1969) (the question of damages is one particularly within the jury's province
.... ); Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. and Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir.
1969) (jury decides which conduct contributed to or caused all or part of damage).
97. See, Russon v. Range, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 236, 237-39, 395 N.E.2d 10, 12-13
(1979), and Stephens v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 998, 1015-17 (1979) for a definition
and explanation of assumption of risk.
98. By which I mean that a court may find that a defendant is 80% liable and thus,
responsible for 80% of the damages. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 470-79.
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judgment against the defendant. 99 A black letter rule of law states that
damages in a negligence action must be proven and may not be spec-
ulative. 00 Like most black letter rules, however, there is also an opposing
rule, equally well established, that a jury may reasonably estimate and
infer damages from the evidence provided.' 0'
In Lange, the court found for the defendant because it found that
there was no way for a jury to know whether the damages claimed by
the plaintiff would have been incurred irrespective of the mediation
process. 0 12 There was no proof that, had the plaintiff hired additional
accountants and expended additional attorney time for discovery, that
a more favorable settlement than that reached in the mediation would
have occurred. 03 The court reasoned, therefore, that the additional
expenses stemmed from the husband's intransigence, not the mediator's
negligence. 0 4 In a similar fashion, the court found that the wife's success
in obtaining a superior agreement from the husband may have had
nothing to do with the mediator's alleged failures but rather was a
result of the aggressive posture adopted by the wife's attorney after the
mediation. 05
The court's reasoning is subject to criticism. If the mediator/defendant
in Lange had undertaken to ensure a fair exchange of information
between husband and wife but had failed to conduct himself in ac-
cordance with minimal professional standards in achieving that end,
there is a strong argument that the expenses incurred by the wife to
obtain that information following the mediation were a direct result of
the defendant's negligence. Many professional mediators have outlined
specific procedures that ensure the free exchange of information in a
divorce mediation. Apparently none of these procedures was followed
in Lange. Furthermore, to the extent the mediator pursues an agreement
between the two parties in such a way that a reasonable person would
question the basic procedural fairness of the agreement, it is arguable
that any loss to the parties as a result of the, delay caused by the
99. See, e.g., Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (cause of action
does not accrue until injury occurs); Biscoe v. Kowalski, 290 S.W.2d 133 (Mo.1956) (no
damages, no basis for action).
100. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976) (damages may not
be awarded on the basis of mere speculation).
101. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563-65
(1931) (if damages cannot be ascertained with certainty, a reasonable approximation will
suffice); Knowell Constr. Co. v. Hanson, 209 Neb. 461, 308 N.W.2d 356 (1981) (damages
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty); Melton v. United States, 488 F. Supp.
1066, 1075 n.35 (1980) (when amount of damages is uncertain, trier of fact may make
reasonable inferences).
102. Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Mo. App. 1981).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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mediator should be compensated by the mediator. 0 6
In the Lange case, the mediator and the husband allegedly hounded
the wife in the psychiatric ward of a hospital where she was receiving
treatment for depression.'0 7 In addition, they allegedly forced her to
conduct negotiations while she was sedated. 108 It is arguable that a
reasonably competent mediator would refuse to operate under such
conditions and would instead postpone the mediation until the wife
recovered. As was the situation in Lange, the mediator who offers parties
a fair dispute settlement process must assume responsibility for the
failure to deliver this process in a reasonably competent manner. As a
result of the mediator's negligence, the wife probably signed an agree-
ment that was substantively biased and procedurally tainted. There was
no pre-exchange of information, and the negotiations themselves were
conducted while the wife was sedated. When the wife finally recovered
from her illness, she opted out of the agreement, which resulted in a
ten month delay of her support payments. 09 The wife's argument is
that the lost payments constituted damages resulting from the mediator's
negligence.
It would be difficult to estimate the support payments that would
have been lost if a mediator had not gotten involved. But, as in this
case where a mediator was part of the process, the jury may be justified
in finding that the lost support was a direct result of the mediator's
activity. Traditional tort law may require proof that damages were a
reasonable result of the mediator's activity. It is one thing to prove that
damages reasonably occurred as a result of a mediator's activity, it is
another matter to demand proof that the damage did not result from
any other possible cause. The Lange court exceeded traditional tort
standards and required the latter.
Other damage theories exist that can apply to mediation cases.
Opportunities have value." 0 If a mediator acts negligently, the parties
involved irr the mediation may lose the opportunities either to resolve
the dispute more favorably or to receive the help. of a more competent
mediator who would aid them in reaching a more beneficial settlement."'
Thus, when there is an increased risk of harm to a plaintiff, the imposition
of liability is possible even if other factors could have caused the harm."
2
106. See Chaykin, supra note 1, at 749; see Note, Sultans, supra note 3, at 1888-
91.
107. Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237,237 (Mo. App. 1981).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 238.
110. See generally Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 719 (1978).
111. See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632-33 (4th Cir. 1966) (Erroneous
diagnosis made it impossible for any other physician to save patient, thus defendant's
argument that patient would have died anyway is rejected).
112. See, Thornton v. CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316, 323-25 (W.Va 1983). Of course, the
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Envision a situation where a mediator provides inaccurate information
to parties who rely upon it in their negotiations. At least one argument
exists that the parties have lost the chance of negotiating a better
agreement because of the mediator's failure to disclose the false nature
of the statements. This theory may also be applicable if a mediator
negligently creates such a hostile and coercive atmosphere that the
mediation itself presents a substantial risk of harm. The law in this
area is not well developed," 3 but it may find application in the area of
mediator liability as it evolves.
C. Fiduciary Duty as a Substitute for Torts
The law of fiduciary duty may provide a way around some of the
difficult damage and causation problems endemic to application of the
law of professional negligence to mediators.14 The law of fiduciary duties
provides a flexible, equitable remedy when one places his trust in another
and then has those expectations defeated." 5 Once a court determines
that a fiduciary relationship exists, a high standard of behavior is
imposed." 6 The fiduciary must be honest, serve only the interests of
his charge, and operate in a careful and scrupulous manner." 7 The
fiduciary may not benefit at the expense of his charge, nor may he
violate the trust of one charge to vindicate the interests of another."'
Although a theory of liability based on fiduciary duty may be useful
in some cases, it is probable that the negligence theory, where it can
be established, will be preferred."19 On the other hand, lawyers repre-
senting plaintiffs in tort suits against mediators will not want to overlook
the possibility of a fiduciary duty theory. (In some cases, a fiduciary
liability theory may provide an avenue for a sympathetic court to grant
some relief when it finds it would have to do too much damage to
established tort law to allow a negligence action.) As a practical matter,
one would expect these theories to be brought together, with plaintiffs'
lawyers hoping to succeed on one of the interrelated theories.
When applying the law of fiduciary duties to mediators, the theory's
strengths can also be its weaknesses. The judicial interpretation of
fiduciary relationships is not consistent. 20 Courts most often limit their
amount of damages should probably be discounted, in some manner, by the likelihood of
harm. See Schaefer, supra note 110, at 719-29.
113. Indeed further work on "value of chance" theory and its application to mediator
liability is needed.
114. Chaykin, supra note 1.
115. See id. at 738.
116. Id. at 739-44.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. This is partly because some courts are reluctant to discover fiduciary duties. See
supra text accompanying note 4.
120. Chaykin, supra note 1, 745-49.
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holdings to the peculiar facts of each case,'2' unless the case fits into
one of the "semi-automatic"' 22 fiduciary categories. Since it is difficult
to predict the conditions under which a court will find a fiduciary duty,
it would be difficult to draft model legislation that offers a single rule
of law relative to the fiduciary duties of a mediator.
Moreover, even where a court finds that the parties justifiably placed
such trust in a mediator/fiduciary, it will often be difficult for a court
to proscribe specific rules. If a fiduciary relationship has involved paying
one party for services, an appropriate remedy for a breach of the
fiduciary's duties would be the return of the money. Consequential
damages are also possible if a fiduciary duty has been breached. Fi-
duciary duties work well when the fiduciary has entered into a transaction
on behalf of the client in which the fiduciary has benefited. A court
imposing a fiduciary duty will also know what remedy to impose if the
fiduciary has taken payments or improperly diverted funds from one to
whom the duty is owed. In both cases, the fiduciary will be required
to turn over the ill-gotten profits or to repay the plaintiff.
In most mediation situations, the structure is more complex. The
parties will not just want to recover the funds paid to the mediator,
they may want to collect for consequential damages caused by the
breach of duty. Equitable remedies available in a fiduciary duties case
impose serious limitations on courts, since tort damages are being
redressed.2 3 Thus, due to the sensitivity of this area, it is a poor place
to interpose model legislation.
V. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
A. Problem Revealed
A mediator may be charged with liability to third parties who are
not participants in the mediation process. (Already discussed were certain
kinds of business liabilities like breach of contract or false advertising
that could conceivably be brought against parties who are strangers to
the mediation.) The focus of this section is on situations in which the
mediator may incur liability as a result of his actions during mediation.
The resolution of many of the questions that arise in this area bears a
121. Id. at 748. "[T]he case decisions vary widely, often turning upon rather idio-
syncratic facts." Id.
122. For instance, corporate officers, trustees, partners, and agents are almost always
deemed to be acting under a fiduciary duty. Id. at 740-41.
123. The Sultans note criticized the fiduciary model partly because it would impose
actual liability on the mediator instead of allowing for a restitutional remedy. Note,
Sultans, supra note 3, at 1877 (mediators should not always be forced to internalize costs
of defective agreements). Actually, the truth is just the opposite. Fiduciary duties work
best to put the parties back where they were. See Chaykin, supra note 1, at 758, n.147.
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strong relationship to the issues discussed in the section of mediator
confidentiality. Consider the following:
Situation I: M is a labor mediator working towards an agreement on a
bitter labor dispute. During the negotiations, a terrible fight breaks out
between two rival factions within the labor team. M calls for separate
discussions with all parties. During a private conversation with a member
of one of the more militant factions, a union member tells the mediator
that "if that guy sells out the union for peanuts, we are going to make
him pay." M believes that the threat is serious. M wants to warn the
threatened party but (1) fears that it might endanger the prospects for
agreement which depend on the strength of the more moderate faction,
and (2) considers the statement made to him to be confidential. M decides
not to reveal anything. The moderate faction settles the strike for modest
gains. Three days later, the leader of the moderate faction is assaulted
and severely injured. The injured party learns that M knew of the threat
and made no effort to warn him. He sues M for damages.
Situation 2: M is a mediator in a neighborhood justice center attached
to a local criminal court. An assault and battery case is referred to M.
During the mediation, the victim and the alleged perpetrator determine
that they have no quarrel with each other and that Smith, a third party,
is at fault. The parties agree that they have to "get" Smith. M tells them
that physically harming Smith would serve no purpose and suggests that
Smith be called in so that further mediation can continue. The parties
then say that "everything is fine" and "not to worry about Smith." M is
sure that the parties are going to harm Smith. On the other hand, he
told the parties that everything that they said during the mediation would
be confidential. He decides to say nothing. The next day, Smith is severely
beaten and suffers permanent injuries.
Situation 3: M is a family mediator. During the course of a divorce
mediation between H and W, M hits an impasse over the issue of child
visitation. M decides to hold separate caucuses with H and W. During
one of the caucuses, W says, "you can't tell my husband I said this
because he'll kill me for it, but the reason I can't allow any unsupervised
visitation is because he beats the children and has been doing it for years.
That's why I want to wrap this divorce up right away, because each day
that he has access to those children is one more day that they're in
danger." M advises W to seek orders of care and protection from the
court, but W insists that she has friends who have obtained those orders
and the children were beaten anyway because the police can never get
there in time. She asks M to help her get the divorce wrapped up as
soon as possible by convincing H that he should go along with the supervised
visitation. The negotiation session for the day ends without an agreement.
H is living separately but he still has access to the children. What should
M do now?
Situation 4: During the course of a business mediation between two
companies in the same industry, the parties enter into what amounts to
an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade. The mediator suggests that this
activity is illegal, but the parties go ahead anyway after stating, "you
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can't say anything because all of this is confidential." The mediation ends.
Does the mediator have an obligation to inform the proper parties? If he
remains silent is he subject to suit as part of the conspiracy to restrain
competition?
These problems illustrate the difficulty a mediator may face when
he or she has knowledge that can protect the third party, but for various
reasons fails to disclose the information. The last situation illustrates
that the mediator may also harm third parties if he does disclose
confidential information.
Many mediators guarantee a certain amount of confidentiality to
their clients, and are thus predisposed to maintaining this promise.
Because the law requires mediators to disclose some revelations when
certain conditions prevail, no rule of confidentiality should exist that
would override this rule of law. This position is consistent with the
belief that mediators should not be immune from liability. Little proof
exists to show that the social utility of allowing mediators to remain
quiet outweighs the immediate social need for the information.
B. The Tarasoff Concept
In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,124 the California
Supreme Court found a psychotherapist negligent when he failed to
warn a coed of his patient's threats to murder her. 25 The decision in
Tarasoff is part of an expanding exception to the general common law
rule that one is not responsible for the tortious acts of another. 26 As
such, it is expected that the Tarasoff concept will have narrow application
subject to many limiting criteria.
In Tarasoff, the psychotherapist's duty to disclose was triggered by
the relationship between the psychotherapist and his patient. 2 The court
reasoned that this special relationship placed the psycotherapist under
a duty to control the patient's conduct.'28 It is unlikely, however, that
this same duty will attach to a mediator because of the unique aspect
of the doctor-patient relationship.
The psychotherapist has the ability to exercise physical control over
the patient by involuntarily committing him to an institution. It is for
this reason that the court found that the psychotherapist had both a
duty to warn and a duty to take measures to gain physical control over
the patient.
It is important to recognize that this duty is triggered only when the
124. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
125. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 435-39, 551 P.2d at 343-46.
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defendant can foresee harm to third parties. In Tarasoff, the foresee-
ability of the patient's acts was considered common knowledge because
the psychotherapist began to take actions to restrict the patient's
freedom.'29 Those actions, however, were ineffective. It was therefore
clear from the facts that the psychotherapist knew that the patient was
dangerous and that he would do harm to the victim. 30
If we compare the facts in Tarasoff to those that would normally
arise as a result of a mediation, several important differences exist. A
mediator does not have the ability, in most situations, to exercise the
same kind of physical control over the participants in a dispute as does
a psychotherapist treating a patient."' Moreover, partly because of this
lack of control, it can be strongly argued that a mediator does not have
the same close relationship with participants to a negotiation that a
psychotherapist has with his patient. Unlike a psychotherapist, a mediator
may not have the skills to determine whether a particular threat is real
or not. The Tarasoff court clearly stated that even psychotherapists
could not be found liable where they were exercising their professional
judgment, as opposed to making a mistake that exceeded the scope of
reasonable behavior in that profession. Therefore, as defined in Tarasoff
the scope of liability is extremely narrow.' 32
129. Id.
130. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345.
131. One commentator suggests that mediators associated with criminal court programs
may incur liability because they have some ability to incarcerate the party. Comment,
Wake of Tarasoff supra note 49, at 214-17. The short answer to this is that there are
still other Tarasoff requirements that would have to be fulfilled before the mediator could
be held liable. Moreover, the decision of which charges are to be filed is left to the
prosecutor, with the mediator having only "input." Id. at 217, n.45. This is not the same
kind of control described in Tarasoff. Id. at 214, n.23.
132. This article takes an opposite view from that presented in a well researched
treatment of this issue. See, Comment, Wake of Tarasoff, supra note 49. The commentator
takes the position that Tarasoff type liability presents a strong threat to mediators, and
that legislation is needed to protect them. Id. at 212. It is true that some statutes, id.
at 218-21 [discussing New York statutes], and the common law may impose limited duty
to disclose confidential information. These duties, however, have not foreclosed the practice
of psychotherapy, or other fields where limited disclosure of confidential information is
required. The flaw in the Wake comment is that it equates the duty to disclose with the
death knell of mediation. Id. at 210, n.5. There is little proof that this is true. Parties
need not be promised absolute confidentiality in order for them to discuss a matter
candidly. Partial protection from subpeona or evidentiary discovery may be appropriate,
but this is a much more limited remedy than holding mediators harmless for their acts
in the narrow circumstances in which a Tarasoff situation might occur. It should be
noted that the Wake comment did not go that far, and that the major thrust of the
author's analysis appears to be geared to the court adjunct mediator operating as an arm
of the law. Comment, Wake of Tarasoff supra note 49, at 221-24. Even here, however,
there is no evidence demonstrating how much confidentiality mediators need in order for
mediation to work. Furthermore, mediation is not a value that should be pursued in
derogation of all other values in all cases. There are serious costs that arise from the
protection of mediators and from imbuing mediators with special evidentiary privileges.
Such privileges should not be extended unless it is clear that society will benefit. See
Green, supra note 49.
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The most likely impact of Tarasoff on mediators is that mediators
will be responsible for the harm caused by others when they (1) know
or should have known that such harm will occur and (2) have some
special relationship with the party that disclosed the information so that
there is a certain degree of control over that party or (3) have some
special relationship with the potential victim of the threatened behavior.
These conditions are most likely to prevail in family mediations where
the negotiations are emotionally charged and, to some extent, the me-
diator may be perceived to carry obligations that go well beyond the
expeditious settlement of the dispute. For instance, many family me-
diators feel that they have a special relationship to the children. In
addition, the potential harm to innocent parties is immediate and often
great. It is partly for this reason that most states have enacted laws
requiring professionals to disclose any information that pertains to child
abuse. 33
In business and labor settings, the mediator is usually not as involved
with the parties as he is in family disputes. A mediator in a business
or labor context does not assume the same kind of responsibility for
his clients as does a family mediator. This does not mean that the
mediator has no role in settling business and labor disputes; it simply
means that the emotional and professional relationship differs. Although
all negotiations can be heated, labor and business disputes generally
occur in a more public and less intimate context than family disputes.
It is therefore unlikely that the same kinds of dangers that are present
in family disputes would arise in the labor or business context.
Still, in both family, business, or labor settings, there may be situations
in which the mediator will be convinced that irreparable harm to either
a third party or one of the parties to the mediation is about to occur
unless he warns the targeted party. No reason exists to require the
mediator to keep this information confidential. If disclosure occurs, it
could be argued that the mediator would be violating a duty of neutrality,
or that the revelation would chill participation in the mediation. The
mediator's knowledge that one party is violent is likely to affect his
neutrality. If the mediator does not warn the endangered party, but
keeps the information to himself, does that make him more neutral? If
anything, he is hiding his bias from the parties which is arguably
improper. Secondly, mediators clearly do not want to chill participation
in the mediation since it may prevent dealing with underlying issues
and produce an unrealistic agreement. It is quite likely that parties that
reveal such information are somehow seeking help; it would be unfor-
tunate to refuse help under the guise of some vague notion of
confidentiality.
133. Ouo REV. CODE ANN. § 5153.28 (Page 1981) is a good example.
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Finally, various "confidential relationships" exist where the partici-
pants claim some social utility in keeping the information confidential.
Few of these relationships are recognized by the law because of the
belief that there is a more immediate social utility of disclosing infor-
mation when certain conditions exist.
In sum, Tarasoff is an exception to the general rule that one is not
responsible for the acts of another. Liability is unlikely in this situation
because of the many safeguards built into the Tarasoff exception.
However, when mediators are highly involved with their clients and
bear an explicit or implicit responsibility to the parties of a mediation
or certain third parties, it is reasonable to require a duty to warn where
the mediator knows or should know that an innocent victim will be
injured.' 34
VI. THE OVERLAP OF THE LIABILITY THEORIES
Although different theories of liability are given various legal titles,
in actuality, there is substantial overlap among tort theories, contract
theories, and theories based on violation of a fiduciary duty. Before
moving on to a discussion of mediation immunity, it is useful to review
the landscape of mediator liability so that some of the broad concepts
within and interconnections between the various liability theories may
be understood.
Three relatively unique features distinguish mediator liability from
analyses of other professionals' liabilities. First, the parties to the agree-
ment remain in full legal control of the situation and are themselves
responsible for the results regardless of the mediator's actions. Second,
the mediator has no responsibility to any third party not involved in
the mediation. Finally, the mediator has special privileges which can
isolate him from any liability with respect to his actions or failure to
act involving confidences.
These three concepts are exceptions pertinent only to mediator liability
and will be representative in causes of action involving matters in
contract, tort, or a breach of fiduciary duty. A breach of contract claim
has the best chances of success, but only if there is a contractual
provision on point, and only if the plaintiff can show that the breach
caused damage. A professional malpractice theory is not dependent on
the existence of a contract, but the plaintiff will have to satisfy the
court that the mediator breached the minimal standard of practice for
the profession and that the breach was a legal cause of the harm.
134. It may be that mediators operating in criminal settings may also face some
difficulties. See Comment, Wake of Tarasoff, supra note 49. Certain common law
immunities may protect these mediators. See infra text accompanying notes 135-38. On
the other hand, perhaps all mediators should be much more circumspect about their
guarantees of confidentiality.
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Failure-to-warn causes of action will be ineffective unless the plaintiff
can meet the stringent requirements of Tarasoff This may be easier
to do when the person the mediator failed to warn was a participant
in the mediation. Even here, however, some courts would not allow the
plaintiff's cause of action. Torts based on defamation or invasion of
privacy have some possibility of success, except that the mediator may
claim that he or she is privileged to make those statements in a mediation
context. At least in this last example, the burden will be on the mediator
to prove the defense.
When viewed in context, liability claims against mediators will be
difficult and usually unsuccessful. Additionally, the mediator may claim
immunity from suit for all acts undertaken in the course of the mediation.
This will shield the mediator from liability and can be raised at a pre-
trial stage. As a result, this is the mediator's strongest defense.
VII. MEDIATOR IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY
A. The Temptation of Immunities
Immunities shield defendants from liability.'35 No new immunities
have been created recently, and existing immunities have been re-
stricted. 3 6 The granting of an immunity is a matter of public policy
that balances the social utility of the immunity against the social loss
of being unable to attack the immune defendant.
In other words, immunity encourages carelessness by removing the
incentive of cautiousness. One loss involves the concept that the pos-
sibility of liability creates important economic incentives among those
in a given industry to strive to minimize the chances of liability. It is
therefore not surprising that no new immunities have been yreated in
modern American law, and that those that do exist have beep severely
limited. Of the immunities that remain, the two that offer the mediator
the greatest hope of protection are the judicial and the arbitral immunity.
Although the judicial and arbitral immunities can be criticized upon
various grounds, it is quite possible to accept the validity of both of
these immunities and make a strong argument that neither of these
should extend to mediators. The purposes behind the judicial and arbitral
immunities are not implicated in mediation. Furthermore, it will be
important to recognize that the judicial and arbitral immunities have
limitations. Therefore, even if the immunity did extend to mediators,
its utility may be exaggerated.
135. "An immunity is a freedom from suit or liability." PROSSER. supra note 2, at
1032.
136. For instance, the scope of governmental and sovereign immunities have been
restricted. "In recent years, traditional immunity doctrines have been criticized more and
more .... " Block, supra note 23, at 879.
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The law of immunity is the most likely candidate for model legislation.
Immunity statutes can be drafted so as not to damage general tort law.
These statutes provide immunity based on public policy grounds to the
certain class of individuals who mediate disputes. In fact, several me-
diator immunity statutes already exist.'37 Practical problems exist that
inhere in drafting such a statute, such as deciding who is covered by
the immunity, 3 but these problems can be overcome. In reality, however,
the immunity probably is not necessary and traditional immunities do
not apply.
B. The Purpose of the Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity has a long history dating back to early English
Common Law. 139 The primary purpose of the immunity is the protection
of judges from dissatisfied litigants who may find fault with the judge
instead of looking to the weaknesses of their own case.
140
The immunity is thought to be necessary, even though the judge has
the same means of defending himself against frivolous lawsuits as any
other litigant, because even the effort involved in defending frivolous
suits is thought to be a serious threat to the judiciary.14 ' In addition to
conserving judicial resources, the immunity is based on the policy that
judges who fear the possibility of a law suit as a result of their improper
137. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-306(2) (Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.12, §
1805(E) (West Supp. 1985).
138. In other words, how do we define "mediator" for the purposes of an immunity
statute? Should the definition be limited to licensed or certified mediators? Should it be
limited to court-appointed mediators, or mediators who operate in certain circumscribed
contexts? A court might have difficulty drawing a logical distinction between the neigh-
borhood elder who mediates an agreement between disputing neighbors and the business
mediator who acts as a mediator in a commercial dispute. A legislature should be able
to reach some politically acceptable compromise. On the other hand, there is no obvious
reason why mediator immunity would have to be limited.
139. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978), has revived scholarly interest in the scope of immunity doctrines. See, Comment,
What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immunity, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1503 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, FORDHAM]; Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to
Absolute Judicial Immunity? 21 Hous. L. REV. 875 (1984) [hereinafter Rosenberg]; Block,
supra note 23. Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV.
201 (1980).
140. "Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial
immunity is thought to be in the best interests of 'the proper administration of justice
... [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him [to] be
free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself."' Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 347, 80 U.S. 646, 649 (1872)).
141. Several commentators have argued that an absolute judicial immunity, even one
that would insulate judges from lawsuits alleging judicial malice, is the only way to assure
that the purposes behind the doctrine of judicial immunity will be vindicated. These
commentators fear that normal pretrial procedures will not offer sufficient protection,
even if a qualified judicial immunity is promulgated. A qualified judicial immunity is a
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judicial actions could become intimidated and lose independence in their
decisionmaking. 142
Historical evidence suggests that even with these important policy
justifications, judicial immunity would still not be possible absent the
existence of appellate review. 43 Appellate review supplies the alternative
to bringing suit against a judge. Any error committed by a judge should
be corrected through the appellate process and should not be addressed
through the filing of a lawsuit. When viewed in this light, the judicial
immunity tends to support the integrity of the appellate process by
ensuring that litigants will appeal their grievances against the trial court
instead of starting a collateral attack directly upon the judge.
At least one commentator defines the term "judicial act" in light of
the opportunity of appellate review. 44 Certain activities performed by
a judge that are subject to judicial review may be deemed covered by
the immunity while other activity would be deemed legislative, admin-
istrative, or ministerial. 45 However, most jurisdictions do not define
"judicial act" as logically, 46 thus the immunity is probably overly broad.
The historical requirement of the attaching judicial immunity only
within the jurisdiction of the judge,147 has been the subject of much
criticism. For purposes of this Article, however, it is sufficient to
understand that a judge is absolutely immune from liability if he is
shield that can be pierced if the judge has acted with malice. See, Block, supra note 23,
at 922. See also Comment, 47 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REV. 81, 93 (1978), quoted in Block,
supra note 23, at 922. "Thus, suits charging a judge with malice or corruption could not
be easily disposed of under summary judgment procedures." Id.
Of course, there is no empirical evidence that judicial immunity is a necessary
component of our system of justice. Even if we approve of judicial immunity for most
cases, recent scholarly comment casts doubt on the propriety of the immunity when judges
cause damage through acts not subject to appeal. See Block, supra note 23.
142. See Block, supra note 23, at 915 n.207.
143. See id. at 881-85, nn.11-28.
144. "Judicial immunity developed to protect the appellate system from collateral
attacks on judgments, thus channeling actions upward through the appellate hierarchy for
the correction of error. The availability of appellate correction of error is, therefore,
absolutely central to the logic of judicial immunity. For this reason, in Sparkman, the
action complained of prevented the complaintant from seeking normal appellate correction
of error." Block, supra at 924.
145. Id. Accord, Comment FORDHAM supra note 139, at 1507-13. The courts appear
to be putting the brakes on the burgeoning judicial immunity. See, Pulliam v. Allen, 104
S. Ct. 1970 (1984) (allowing suit for injunctive relief against judge under § 1983); Rankin
v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (private agreement between judge and a party
to find in party's favor not a judicial act), cert. denied, Zeller v. Rankin, 451 U.S. 939
(1981); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (derogatory comments in media
not judicial act). See also, "Rosenberg", supra note 139.
146. For example, in Stump v. Sparkman, Justice White argues that the appropriate
test is "whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations
of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.' Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 335, 362 (1978).
147. For a more complete discussion of the jurisdiction requirement see authorities
cited at note 139, supra.
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undertaking to perform a "judicial act." The definition of "judicial act"
is crucial to the determination of the scope of judicial immunity, but
no universal definition exists. Nevertheless, it is safe to state that judicial
immunity is broad, all-encompassing, and highly effective in extinguish-
ing most lawsuits against judges. It is essentially the independence of
the judicial machinery that is being protected, and the existence of
appellate correction that makes judicial immunity feasible.
C. The Extension of the Immunity to Arbitrators
The extension of judicial immunity to arbitrators is based on the
common sense concept that arbitrators are essentially performing a
judicial function and should therefore enjoy the same. kind of protection
as do judges.'48 Arbitral immunity, sometimes called "quasi-judicial"
immunity, acts as a shield only when the arbitrator performs acts that
pertain to the rendering of a decision. 49 They are not immune for other
administrative, contractual, or ministerial acts that fall beyond the
decisionmaking function. 50 Some would argue that judicial immunity
should be subject to that same limitation, but, to date, judicial immunity
is still broader than arbitrator immunity.'
At any rate, it appears that arbitrators may be held liable if they
delay issuing their decisions too long. 52 Support also exists for arguing
that "expert arbitrators," like accountants or architects, who have an
advisory or consultational role, are not immune for acts related to that
148. "Because they frequently proceed quasi-judicially, arbitrators are generally afforded
an immunity from liability for the consequences of their decisions or awards that are
comparable to that accorded judges." Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 250, 478 A.2d
397, 401 (1984).
"Courts of this country have long recognized immunity to protect arbitrators from
civil liability for actions taken in the arbitrator's quasi-judicial capacity. Arbitral immunity,
like judicial immunity, promotes fearless and independent decisionmaking. To this end,
the courts have refused to hold judges and arbitrators liable for their judicial actions."
Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 982-83, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (Ct. App.
1983) (footnotes omitted).
149. "Cases in which courts have clothed arbitrators with immunity have involved
disgruntled litigants who sought to hold an arbitrator liable for alleged misconduct in
arriving at a decision." Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983, 189 Cal. Rptr.
834, 837 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis in original).
150. For instance, in Baar, the court held that an arbitrator was liable for failure to
make findings on time. The court reasoned that the immunity for decisionmaking did not
include immunity to avoid making the decision. Id. at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 840. The
court was careful to explain that arbitral and judicial immunity were not coextensive.
The court was a bit vague as to how the judicial immunity was broader. "Judicial action
therefore demands that civil immunity be granted a judge in all aspects of decisionmaking."
Id. at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839. How this differs from "alleged misconduct in arriving
at a decision," id., is not exactly clear. It is quite apparent, however, that a judicial delay
in issuing a decision would have been covered by the judicial immunity. See, e.g., Wyatt
v. Arnot, 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
152. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983).
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT FOR MODEL LEGISLATION
role. 153 The arbitrator cannot be sued for issuing a decision that is
clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind extending the immunity to arbitrators pursuing
only their decisionmaking function appears to be related to the idea of
protecting the independence of arbitrators. The law seems to favor
fearless decisionmaking, unfettered by the fear of reprisal and recri-
mination. If the arbitrator has made a mistake in granting an award,
the proper avenue is to test the arbitrator's decision in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Given the purpose behind the extension of the
judicial immunity to arbitrators, it can be strongly argued that the
immunity should not be extended to mediators.
Mediators do not perform an adjudicatory function, 54 therefore they
do not need such complete freedom from liability. Although arbitrators
are free from liability pertaining to their decisionmaking roles, they are,
liable for other acts. Since mediators have no decisionmaking role,
arguably no immunity should exist.
This analysis is complicated somewhat by the hybrid forms of dispute
resolution that are now attaining popularity.'55 Some mediators act as
arbitrators in what are referred to as "med/arb." Under this model,
should the mediation prove unfruitful, the mediator then arbitrates the
dispute.156 Some family mediators will send a recommendation to the
judge if they cannot settle the case. 157 The question arises as to whether
153. For instance, in Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 478 A.2d 397 (1984),
accountants were designated to evaluate the value of a business owned by the husband
as a basis for the negotiation of a marital dissolution. The evaluation was not done in
accordance with accepted accounting procedures. The parties relied on the accountants'
evaluation and made it a centerpiece of their separation agreement. Id. at 247, 478 A.2d
at 398. After recognizing the accountants' negligence, the parties sought to have the
divorce judgment, which incorporated the tainted separation agreement, vacated. The
court refused to vacate the judgment. Id. The parties sued the accountants for negligence,
but the accountants claimed arbitral immunity. Id. In a 4 to 3 decision, id. at 262, 478
A.2d at 408, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the accountants were not
protected by arbitral immunity. Id. at 246, 478 A.2d at 399. The court found that the
parties had contracted with the defendants who were to make an assessment with the
skills expected of reasonably competent accountants. Id. The fact that the divorce court
formally recognized the accountants with a court appointment was irrelevant. Id. at 247-
48, 478 A.2d at 399-401. The distinction between expert consulting or assessment and
arbitral decisionmaking appears to be fairly well established. See, Gammel v. Ernst &
Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co.
of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1977) reh'g denied in part, 559 F.2d 268, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
These cases demonstrate that even though one may be performing some of the functions
of an arbitrator, one is not immune for those acts that deviate too far from the impartial
judicial decisionmaking paradigm. Where one is acting as an expert, consultant, or advisor,
there is probably no immunity for damages resulting from such activities.
154. But see supra text accompanying notes 138-47.
155. For a discussion of hybrid mediation/arbitration formats, see S. GOLDBERG. E.
GREEN, & F. SANDER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 245-311 (1985) [hereinafter
GOLDBERG].
156. Id.
157. See Coogler, supra note 8.
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mediators who also act as arbitrators should be considered mediators
or arbitrators for purposes of liability analysis.
It is first worth noting that this question is probably not as intractable
in practice as it is when viewed theoretically. In most med/arbs, the
mediation and arbitration components are carefully separated so that
the arbitrator makes a decision soley on the record.'58 Even when the
forms are not carefully separated, many med/arbs are structured as
med/arb/opt-out, which means that the parties can withdraw from the
process and select another arbitrator if the mediation is unsuccessful. 159
Further, most med/arbs envision a non-binding arbitration. 160
Still, some instances remain in which it is unclear whether the third
party is a mediator or an arbitrator.' 6' It is difficult to state how the
law shall respond to such a hybrid. First, even in med/arbs, the overriding
goal of the neutral party is to help the parties voluntarily settle the
dispute. Therefore, it is arguable that the dominant role played by the
third party is mediational. This would also be true where the neutral
third party operates in a mini-trial or other similar non-binding settings.
Where the mediator does take on the role of a binding arbitrator,
however, those acts connected to rendering the binding decision should
be covered by the arbitral immunity.
Much will depend on the precise transgression of the med/arbitrator.
If the med/arbitrator makes an error of fact or of law in rendering the
decision, the arbitral immunity should probably apply. In many cases,
the mediator's deficiencies will not be covered by the arbitral immunity.
Mediators can be liable for bad expert advice and failure to perform
their mediative role by not holding meetings in a timely fashion. These
transgressions are actionable whether the neutral is labeled a mediator
or arbitrator. However, where the neutral third party breaches confi-
dentiality or defames a plaintiff during the proceedings, the distinction
might matter. Only those utterances that pertain to the decisionmaking
function should be protected by arbitral immunity. The prevailing goal
of mediation is consensus, and therefore, it is hard to see why the
arbitral immunity should be extended to mediation.
D. The Para Judge Angle
One final analysis of the immunity issue relevant to this discussion
must be addressed. Judges enjoy a broader immunity than arbitrators,
even though a strong argument exists that the law should not grant
158. GOLDBERG. supra note 154, at 256-59.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Some of this role confusion is troubling and thus creates a strong argument
against the med/arb model. See id. at 246.
82
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such a broad immunity.' 62 Nevertheless, judges are immune for all of
their judicial acts, not just acts of decisionmaking.' 63 It can thus be
argued that when mediators act as part of a court referral project, they
are replacing the judge, and should enjoy the protection of the judicial
immunity. In other words, even if the narrower arbitral immunity is
not extended to mediators, mediators who act as court adjuncts should
be protected by the broader judicial immunity.
This argument, however, has at least two problems. First, it is
irrelevant whether or not a mediator is appointed by a court.' 64 Second,
based on modern scholarship on judicial immunity, 6 1 such an extension
would only compound a mistake in the law and intensify the impact of
bad public policy. 166
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the difficulty for resolving the issue of mediator liability, it
may be best to allow it to develop naturally from common law. Although
a mediator's errors may cause damage, courts are likely to view mediators
as mere facilitators. Since so few standards exist that will enable courts
to discern cases in which liability should be imposed, only the extremely
gross abuses will trigger liability for the practitioner. In short, mediators
do not need protection from common law liability at this time. Fur-
thermore, few standards exist in the area of mediator liability which is
one reason why only gross abuses are rightfully discovered.
If legislation is established providing for immunity or altering liability
rules, the high standard of the profession may decline. The cost of this
decline in professional conduct would be too great when compared with
the socially redeeming value of mediation. Therefore, it may not be
wise to propose mediator liability statutes at this time.
162. See Block, supra note 23, at 879-81.
163. But see supra text accompanying notes 141-43, indicating some limits on the
immunity.
164. Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 252, 478 A.2d 397, 402 (1984).
165. Block, supra note 23, at 880.
166. It may be, however, that the court-adjunct mediator is so institutionally distinct,
that he requires additional protection. See, Note, Sultans supra note 3, at 1881-82. I
suspect that the real problem is that some court mediators are under-insured, under-
trained, and under-supported. I do not think it serves society's interests or the mediation
profession's interest to preserve this situation. One way to bring pressure for change is
to show that mediators in these programs face responsibilities and legal duties. Those
working in these programs should therefore obtain proper training, support, and appropriate
insurance.
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